Algorithmes pour la grille et Ordonnancement.

Réunions

Réunion du 25 janvier 07

La réunion aura lieu à l'ENS de Lyon dans l'amphi B. Venir a l'ENS.

Planning

Details

Accueil

Generation aleatoire de graphes pour le benchmarking

Generation de structure combinatoire

Déjeuner

Ordonnancement sur machine heterogene a but de Makespan et de Fiabilite

Mapping pipeline skeletons on heterogeneous platforms

Mapping applications onto parallel platforms is a challenging problem, that becomes even more difficult when platforms are heterogeneous --nowadays a standard assumption. A high-level approach to parallel programming not only eases the application developer's task, but it also provides additional information which can help realize an efficient mapping of the application.

In this talk, we discuss the mapping of pipeline skeletons onto different types of platforms: fully homogeneous platforms with identical processors and interconnection links; communication homogeneous platforms, with identical links but different speed processors; and finally, heterogeneous platforms. We assume that a pipeline stage must be mapped on a single processor, and we establish new theoretical complexity results for two different mapping policies: a mapping can be either one-to-one (a processor is assigned at most one stage), or interval-based (a processor is assigned an interval of consecutive stages). We provide several efficient polynomial heuristics for the most important policy/platform combination, namely interval-based mappings on communication homogeneous platforms.

Break

Performance des algorithmes a veracite garantie pour l'ordonnancement de taches individualistes

This talk deals with problems which fall into the domain of selfish scheduling: a protocol is in charge of building a schedule for a set of tasks without directly knowing their lengths. The protocol gets these informations from the agents who control the tasks. The aim of each agent is to minimize the completion time of her task while the protocol tries to minimize the maximal completion time. When an agent reports the length of her task, she is aware of what the others bid and also of the protocol's algorithm. Then, an agent can bid a false value in order to optimize her individual objective function. With erroneous information, even the most efficient algorithm may produce unreasonable solutions. An algorithm is truthful if it prevents the selfish agents from lying about the length of their tasks. The central question in this paper is: ``How efficient a truthful algorithm can be?" We study the problem of scheduling selfish tasks on parallel identical machines. Without considering side payments, our goal is to give a picture of the performance under the condition of truthfulness.

Multiplication de matrices sur plate-forme maitre esclave.

This work is aimed at designing efficient parallel matrix-product algorithms for heterogeneous master-worker platforms. There are three key hypotheses that render our work original and innovative:

Discussion